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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-1233 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT ODOM,  
             Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-11-cr-00649-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 18, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, CHAGARES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 30, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Robert Odom (“Odom”) was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted 
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), after a jury trial in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Odom appeals that conviction and asserts 
that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We will affirm. 
I. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
On April 9, 2011, two Philadelphia policemen, William Hoppe (“Hoppe”) and 
Leonard Ginchereau (“Ginchereau”), were flagged down by a woman, Shelmina Boone 
(“Boone”), and her male friend in front of R&R Auto Repair (“R&R”) at the intersection 
of Bridge and James Streets in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Boone told the officers that 
she had been threatened by a black man with a gun and that he had left the scene by way 
of James Street in a black limousine. The officers commenced a search, by way of James 
Street, and pulled over a black limousine driven by a black man several blocks away from 
R&R in an area not known to have many limousines. 
Two other Philadelphia policemen, Brian Clerkin (“Clerkin”) and Michael 
Chichearo, responded to a call for assistance at R&R. Boone relayed the same story to 
these officers but with more detail. Those officers then took Boone to where Odom was 
pulled over. Boone identified Odom as the man who had threatened her with the gun. 
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Clerkin looked inside the limousine’s driver’s side door, which was still open, and 
saw a handgun protruding from the floor’s torn upholstery next to the radio compartment 
on the driver’s side of the vehicle. Boone identified the gun as the one Odom had 
threatened her with at R&R. Odom was then placed under arrest. That day, an 
investigator took a signed statement from Boone. After a follow-up investigation, the 
officers determined that Odom was the registered owner of the limousine, operated a 
limousine driving business, and owned R&R.   
During grand jury proceedings, Boone provided testimony that echoed her 
statements to police the day of the incident and adopted her prior signed statement. At 
trial, however, Boone claimed she had memory loss and could not have her recollection 
refreshed because she did not have her glasses with her that day. Odom stipulated to the 
authenticity of the grand jury transcript, which included Boone’s statements. Odom, 
however, raised an objection to the admittance of the transcript and Boone’s statements to 
police as substantive evidence. The District Court admitted them over the objection. 
Odom testified in his own defense, asserting that Boone and her male friend 
wielded a gun and threatened him. Odom also testified that other persons drove and had 
access to the limousines and that he did not know a gun was in the limousine. Despite his 
testimony, the jury found Odom guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Odom 
was later sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. 
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II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal action under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction over Odom’s challenge to his conviction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over Odom’s insufficiency of the evidence 
claim.1  In exercising that review, the evidence must be viewed “in the light most 
favorable to the Government” as the verdict winner.2 A request for a new trial and review 
of a trial court’s decision to admit evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion.3 
III. 
We discuss Odom’s challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence based on his two 
alternative requests for relief, (A) acquittal and (B) a new trial, in turn.   
A. 
Odom first argues that Boone’s grand jury testimony and statements to police 
should not have been admitted at trial. We disagree. Boone’s statement to Hoppe was 
made right after the incident, and Hoppe testified that Boone was in an excited state and 
that Boone was flagging them down for immediate assistance.4 Thus, admitting this 
                                              
1 United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 423-24 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc). This Court will not review the Government’s assertion that we should review for 
plain error as we affirm under this less deferential standard. 
2 United States v. Rieger, 942 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). 
3 United States v. Jasin, 280 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Green, 
556 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2009), respectively. 
4 J.A. at 195. 
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statement as an excited utterance was not an abuse of discretion.5 Further, Boone 
identified Odom after seeing him at R&R a short time thereafter. Hence, admitting 
Boone’s statement identifying Odom as substantive evidence of identification was not an 
abuse of discretion.6 Lastly, Boone’s signed statement is admissible as a recorded 
recollection because Boone adopted it by way of her signature, she was unable to recall 
the statement at trial but identified the signature as her own, and Boone had previously 
adopted it (on the day of the incident) when it was fresh in her mind.7 
Moreover, Boone’s testimony that she had memory loss was likely viewed by the 
District Court, within its discretion, as disingenuous; Boone testified at trial; and Boone 
was subject to cross-examination regarding the grand jury testimony. Thus, admitting the 
grand jury testimony as a prior inconsistent statement was not an abuse of discretion.8  
Odom next asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that he 
knowingly possessed a firearm. Odom bears a heavy burden in challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence as we must “consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
                                              
5 Fed. R. Evid. 803(2); United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454 (3d Cir. 2001). 
6 Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C); United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
7 Fed. R. Evid. 803(5); United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 377-78 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
8 Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); Mornan, 413 F.3d at 378. 
 6 
 
to the government and affirm the judgment if there is substantial evidence from which 
any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”9    
Odom asserts that he did not knowingly possess a firearm through constructive 
possession.10 In order to prove constructive possession, the Government must have 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Odom knew of the gun’s existence, (2) Odom 
had the power to exercise dominion and control over the gun, and (3) Odom intended to 
exercise dominion and control over the gun.11 This proof may be circumstantial.12 
In the case at bar, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that 
Odom had constructive possession of the firearm. Despite Boone’s failed recall and 
Odom’s testimony that Boone had a gun, Boone’s previous grand jury testimony and 
statements to police support a finding that Odom possessed the gun. This is further 
bolstered by Boone’s identification of Odom and of the gun on location the day of the 
incident and Boone’s report of the incident occurring at R&R. Because the jury is free to 
accord weight to a witness’s testimony based on its assessment of the witness’s 
                                              
9 United States v. Benjamin, 711 F.3d 371, 376 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
10 The Government was required to prove (1) that Odom had previously been 
convicted of a felony; (2) that Odom knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) that the 
firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); United States v. 
Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2000). Odom only challenges the second requirement. 
This Court will review only constructive possession, even though the parties address 
actual possession, as it supports affirming the jury verdict. 
11 United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1992). 
12 Id. at 97. 
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credibility,13 a rational jury could find that Boone’s prior grand jury testimony was more 
credible than Odom’s and Boone’s trial testimony, as both were unsupported by the 
testimony of other trial witnesses and Boone’s prior testimony and statements.  
The evidence above is supported by further evidence that Odom knowingly 
possessed the firearm. When Odom was stopped, he was driving a limousine registered in 
his name and no one else was in the vehicle;14 the butt of the gun was visible and placed 
on the driver’s side of the vehicle within Odom’s reach;15 and Odom was stopped within 
a few blocks of his business and within a few minutes of the underlying incident.16  
Although Odom’s proximity to the gun and ownership of the vehicle is not by itself 
enough to prove constructive possession, this Court may consider those factors in the 
context of the surrounding circumstances.17 All of these considerations support a rational 
jury’s finding that Odom constructively possessed the gun. 
This finding is not overcome by Odom’s arguments, drawn from this Court’s 
holding in United States v. Brown,18 regarding the lack of identifiable fingerprints on the 
                                              
13 Rhoades, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 340 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1965). 
14 Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 97 (considering a defendant’s ownership and operation of a 
vehicle in which contraband is found as corroborative factors of constructive possession). 
15 United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 487 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that the gun’s 
location under the vehicle’s front seat “could easily justify the inference … [of the 
defendant’s] constructive possession of the gun”). 
16 United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 183 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding constructive 
possession where the defendant had threatened the victim minutes before a gun was 
found under the defendant’s car seat and the gun matched the victim’s description of it). 
17 Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 97.  
18 3 F.3d 673 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
 8 
 
gun or that the limousine was driven by other people or previously had occupants other 
than Odom.  In Brown, this Court found that the Government had failed to prove 
constructive possession, citing as one factor the absence of the defendant’s fingerprints 
on the seized contraband. But, we made this finding in consideration of other factors in 
Brown: a co-defendant’s fingerprints were on the contraband, the defendant did not own 
the home from which the contraband was seized, and there was no evidence showing that 
the defendant had exerted control over the contraband. Here, the evidence demonstrates 
otherwise: Odom exerted control over the firearm as he was recently seen wielding it; 
Odom owned the vehicle in which the gun was found and R&R, where Boone stated 
Odom used the gun; and, finally, although the fingerprint on the gun was unidentifiable, 
no other fingerprints were on the gun signifying use by another person.19 Thus, Odom has 
failed to show that there was not substantial evidence upon which a rational jury could 
find that he constructively possessed the firearm, and acquittal is therefore unwarranted.    
B. 
Odom did not file a motion for a new trial with the District Court. Because Odom 
failed to make that motion, this Court cannot act upon his request for a new trial and his 
                                              
19 Arnold, 486 F.3d at 181 (finding that a jury could reasonably conclude that the 
gun did not have fingerprints because the defendant had the opportunity to wipe the gun 
off before he was apprehended by the police). 
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argument is waived.20 In the alternative, based on the evidence reviewed above, a new 
trial is not required in the interest of justice.21 
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
                                              
20 A district court may vacate a judgment and grant a new trial only “[u]pon the 
defendant's motion” and may not order a new trial sua sponte. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33; Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 33, advisory comm. notes, 1966 amends.; United States v. Thorton, 1 F.3d 
149 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that where a defendant fails to file a new trial motion before 
the district court, we may not consider his claim on appeal). 
21 Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). 
